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A …rm entering a market often has to solve the problem that con-
sumers do not know the quality of its product. The present paper,
studying entry by a …rm facing an incumbent rival, shows that the
latter’s reaction to entry can work as a substitute for the entrant’s
revelation costs. As a particular case, when …rms use retailers to
sell their goods, the incumbent can decide whether or not to apply
an exclusive dealing clause. Since the incumbent’s strategy entails
enforcement of the clause only against a low quality entrant, shared
retailing reveals to consumers that the entrant’s quality is high, and
the asymmetric information problem is solved. If the possibility of
exclusion is prohibited, the equilibria with entry by the high quality
are destroyed. More generally, the discretionary use of exclusionary
practices, or of comparative advertising, can solve the asymmetric in-
formation problem for the entrant, thereby facilitating entry.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the present paper we show that in markets where consumers have imperfect
information about an entrant’s quality, the possibility for an incumbent to
use exclusionary practices may vehicle useful information to consumers. This
information transmission through the discretionary use of a hostile action by
the incumbent, like the use of exclusions, can enhance competition because
it eliminates the incentive for the entrant to provide low quality. Information
is transmitted at zero costs so that costly information devices that a high
quality entrant should use can be disposed of.
We analyze in particular detail the application of exclusive dealing clauses
in retailing as an example of exclusionary practices. Then we relate our
results to similar phenomena. A producer can foreclose access to a retailing
network via the imposition of exclusive dealing, but he can as well refrain
from applying such clauses and let the entrant share the same retailers he is
contracting with. The shared retailing outcome demonstrates unambiguously
to consumers that the incumbent has not made use of exclusionary clauses.
As we shall show, the incumbent prefers not to exclude if the rival is of high
quality. The latter, indeed, can defend her own reputation, albeit at a cost,
while a low quality cannot. But then if entry and shared retailing prevail,
rational consumers should infer that the entrant produces high quality.
Two mechanisms come to mind why an incumbent might want to refuse to
sell through a retailer together with a potential entrant of low quality: …rst,
the established …rm might gain a competitive advantage when unmasking
a competitor to be of low quality; second, the established …rm might loose
reputation when selling jointly with an entrant of low quality. It depends
on the particular market one has in mind whether one prefers the …rst or
the second explanation. In this paper we take the …rst mechanism. Hence,
we consider a market in which the quality of the incumbent is known with
certainty, as it is the case after an investment in reputation, and cannot su¤er
from entry. We do not model how an incumbent builds up reputation and
simply assume that he has perfectly revealed quality by certifying it. Still,
the incumbent is not indi¤erent as to sharing his reputation because a higher
reputation of the competitor reduces his market power.
2As to the second mechanism, that reputation can su¤er, note that the
possibility to exclude competitors from a distribution channel provides a
mean to protect the manufacturer(s’) brand image or quality recognition
from free-riding by other …rms (see Bork, 1978). This idea has already been
discussed in various places in the literature (e.g. Ornstein, 1989). Similarly,
exclusive dealing protects the manufacturer’s property rights on product de-
sign when competitors could free-ride by supplying imitations to the same
retailers (Marvel, 1982).
The point that exclusionary practices are mainly used as e¢ciency en-
hancing devices has been stressed by the Chicago Law School (Posner, 1976,
Bork, 1978). A rich body of theory follows this idea (see Bernheim and Whin-
ston, 1998 and the references therein). This stands in contrast to the con-
clusion that contractual vertical restraints be anticompetitive (for instance,
Comanor and Frech, 1985) because they could provide a commitment to
foreclose entry.1 Non-price vertical restraints are particularly controversial
in highly concentrated markets with substantial barriers of entry. Since in-
cumbents have already sunk their entry costs, and they have usually granted
for themselves the use of the necessary distribution channels, they can be
suspected to intentionally try and raise entrants’ costs by imposing exclusive
dealing clauses.
Adding to the debate on the competitive e¤ect of exclusionary practices
the present paper focuses on the role of asymmetric information. Under
perfect information, in our model, no exclusionary clauses would be applied
at equilibrium and the possibility to use them or not would be neutral to the
…nal outcome. This is not the case under asymmetric information. Indeed, if
the incumbent cannot pre-commit to the exclusionary practice, he will base
his action upon his information about the entrant’s quality. But then, by
observing the incumbent’s action, consumers can infer the entrant’s quality.
The reasoning driving the result is essentially as follows (for the sake of
simplicity we consider only one incumbent). Since the incumbent knows the
quality of the new entrant, he can react to high and low quality entrants
di¤erently. The incumbent in our framework gains from unmasking an en-
trant to be of low quality. This unmasking can work only if the entrant has
no defence, e.g. if she cannot run a time-consuming and costly advertis-
ing campaign, or provide certi…cation, whether costly or not. A low quality
1Recent analyses of vertical foreclosure focus on cases where an essential facility is
involved (see for instance Rey and Tirole, 1998).
3has no such defense at hand since by de…nition cannot provide unambiguous
evidence of high quality (obviously, furthermore, cheating cannot occur at
equilibrium). By contrast, having sunk the entry cost, a high quality entrant
will defend herself through costly information transmission. Hence, an in-
cumbent by enforcing the exclusivity clauses, only allows for separate dealing
if the entrant is of low quality, whereas he waves the exclusivity rights and
accepts to share the distribution network with a competitor of high quality.
Note that since his brand image cannot su¤er the incumbent bears no direct
loss from sharing the distribution channel. Also, as we show, the entrant
cannot free-ride on the brand image in case exclusive dealing is prohibited.
From the incumbent’s point of view it is not the protection of his brand
image but the indirect payment obtained from the entrant which motivates
him abandoning exclusive dealing clauses. Furthermore, the signaling is an
outcome of belief formation by rational consumers who are able to interpret
the strategy of the incumbent. This suggests that the signaling mechanism
which works with exclusive dealing unveils one of a more basic nature, namely
that the incumbent’s reaction to entry may transmit information about the
entrant’s characteristics.
The assumption that an entrant’s quality may not be known to consumers
is not new (Farrell, 1986) and seems natural for many markets. The assump-
tion that the incumbent is perfectly informed about the competitor’s quality
while consumers are not is certainly admissible for a wide range of cases. It
is indeed true for many markets that the single consumer should a¤ord a
disproportionately high cost to gain information about the entrant while the
…rms in the business, thanks to their knowledge of the technology or to the
network of experts to which they have access, can easily compare their own
product with the entrant’s.
Firms sell through retailers. Retailers are assumed to be small and have
no market power, neither in the pricing nor in the selection of the brands.
This means that we look at vertically related markets in which the down-
stream …rms have no buying power.2 Clearly, since retailers only a¤ect prices
due to their costs we can neglect the pricing decision of the retailers with
great simpli…cation of the analysis. In Section 2, we lay down the model of
2This market structure is often adopted for retailing and follows the Chicago school
thinking. E.g. Ornstein (1989, p. 91) states that in most cases retailers operate in
competitive markets. When retailing markets are not perfectly competitive, in particular
when there are signi…cant barriers of entry to retailing our analysis would need to be
modi…ed.
4entry and show the main results under moral hazard.
In Section 3 we discuss the results. We show that they hold as well under
adverse selection, where exclusion is enforced if Nature has selected the bad
quality product for the entrant. Then we argue that exclusionary practices
play a similar role as membership refusal when used by producers associations
that do not automatically grant membership to applicants but select based
on quality. Alternatively the physical location where to sell can play such a
role if access can be directly or indirectly controlled by established …rms.
We then brie‡y show that comparative advertising can be viewed under
the same light as exclusionary practices in so far as the decision to run a costly
campaign against an entrant may depend upon the quality of the entrant.
No comparative advertising is used against high quality entrants so that
these can save upon their own signaling costs. Prohibition of comparative
advertising would close this information channel. Then, we point out that
an incumbent can engage in a price war against a low quality entrant with
t h es a m es i g n a l i n ge ¤ e c t .
Finally, we discuss the possibility of commitment to exclusionary prac-
tices as a way to foreclose the market against entrants of any quality. We
argue that commitment to exclusionary contractual restraints can possibly
be obtained through certain kinds of investments. Also the admission rules
of associations might make commitment feasible.
Section 4 concludes. Appendix 1 gives some details about the mixed
strategy equilibria and Kohlberg-Mertens stability. Appendix 2 discusses
pooling equilibria under adverse selection.
2 Exclusionary practices and market entry
2.1 An entry game with moral hazard
We analyze a model of entry into a product market in which manufacturers
have to sell their products via retailers. A potential entrant has to pay a
sunk cost e when entering the market. At the same time the entrant has to
decide upon the product quality. For simplicity, we assume that the sunk
cost e is independent of the product quality. The single incumbent I has
already sunk this cost and is known to be of high quality. Before selling their
products manufacturers have to decide upon their distribution channel.
The retailing sector resembles perfect competition because retailers are
5pure Bertrand competitors. Retailers have a …xed cost and a variable cost
which is assumed to be linear in the quantities of the goods they sell. In
addition, retailers have to pay to the manufacturers for the products. We
consider two-part tari¤s which are set by the manufacturers. Retailers take
this price schedule as given. Since there are no sunk entry costs into retailing
retailers can always enter and maximize pro…ts subject to a nonnegative pro…t





where fR is the …xed cost of retailing, cR
i are the product speci…c constant
marginal costs of the retailer and pi and ti are the elements of the two-
part tari¤ of manufacturer i. To keep the analysis simple the …xed cost of
retailing is independent of the number of goods sold through the retailer.
This is a particular assumption of economies-of-scope. The main message
of this section on the use of shared retailers under asymmetric information
and the role of exclusive dealing clauses does not depend on the assumption
of economies-of-scope (see below). Assuming pure Bertrand competition the
retailing sector is perfectly competitive and the retailing prices are pR
i =
pi + cR
i . In order for the retailer to make pro…ts fR ¡
P
ti · 0. Retailers
receive no share of the pro…ts because they have no bargaining power. This
holds if the manufacturers can change retailers at no cost.3 If there is only
one manufacturer this manufacturer will set the transfer equal to fR and set
pi such that it maximizes monopoly pro…ts taking the added costs of retailing
into account. In the case of two manufacturers the sum of transfers equals
the …xed cost of manufacturing.
We assume that under shared retailing manufacturers share the total
…xed cost of retailing f ´
P
fR such that the incumbent pays less than
in the case of the exclusive use of the retailers. For simplicity, we assume
that in the case of shared retailing the entrant pays f as a …xed payment
to the retailers. Under this assumption the entrant does not have a cost
advantage when using the retailer network of the incumbent. As it shall
become clear, our arguments do not depend on a particular sharing rule nor
on the assumption that the entrant cannot make explicit side-payments to
the incumbent.
Under perfect information the manufacturers’ pro…ts gross of …xed costs
depend only on the quality of the competitor. The produced quality coin-
3If there is a cost of changing retailer then the retailers can obtain a share of pro…ts.
However, due to pure Bertrand competition among retailers this does not a¤ect the pricing
decisions but only the …xed transfers ti. Our results hold for the costs of changing the
retailers are not too large.
6cides with the perceived quality and we write ¼I(qE) for the pro…ts of the
incumbent and ¼E(qE) for the pro…ts of the entrant. To simplify matters the
entrant can either choose low or high quality if she enters; i.e. qE 2f L;Hg.
If the entrant does not enter the incumbent makes monopoly pro…ts.
We analyze the following game played by an entrant, an incumbent, and
by consumers. The incumbent has already signed, before the game starts,
a dealing contract with the retailer. If exclusive dealing clauses are allowed
the contract contains such a clause; if they are forbidden, the contract does
not contain it.
Stage 1: The entrant moves and chooses whether: a) enter with high qual-
ity, b) enter with low quality, c) stay out of the market (entry and technology
decision). In case c) the game ends and the incumbent remains a monopolist.
In case of entry the entrant chooses quality qE w h i c hi sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e
between incumbent and entrant but not observed by the consumers. The
entrant pays entry cost e.
Stage 2: If the entrant is in, she …rst decides whether to apply to the
incumbent’s retailer network and then the incumbent chooses between al-
lowing or not the entrant to share the retailing network—namely whether to
enforce or not the exclusionary clause that is attached to the contract linking
incumbent and retailer. In case of shared retailing the entrant pays f and
otherwise each manufacturer pays f.
Stage 3: the entrant decides whether to continue in the market and
whether to certify her product quality. In case of certi…cation she incurs
costs g.
Stage 4: the manufacturers set the wholesale price of their product and
retailers set prices in the …nal product market taking wholesale prices as
given. Manufacturers pay the respective production costs which are d more
for high instead of low quality.
Stage 5: consumers observe the entry decision, prices, certi…cation de-
cisions and retailing arrangements and use this information to form their
beliefs on the product quality of the entrant. Based on their beliefs they
make their purchasing decision.
At a later point we will allow the entrant to randomize between qualities
at stage 1 and the incumbent will be allowed to apply the exclusive dealing
clause with any probability at stage 2. We do not formally introduce the
possibility of random certi…cation but our qualitative results will remain
una¤ected. In our simple model the entrant always wants to access the
retailer network of the incumbent and therefore the …rst part of stage 2 is
7not considered.
As it will become clear, under our assumptions stage 4 is black-boxed in
the pro…t functions since prices depend only upon whether entry has occurred
or not and upon the perceived quality of the entrant. We comment on price
signaling by the incumbent in the next section.4
We look for perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) where we only need sub-
game perfection so that it is equivalent to consider subgame perfect Bayesian
equilibria.
Consider the case of perfect information where, unlike the case of the …ve
stage game, also consumers observe the quality choice of the entrant. This
means that in this case stage 3 is irrelevant and at stage 5 consumers are
perfectly informed.
At the subgame after stage 4, manufacturers choose prices noncooper-
atively and take the marginal costs of retailing into account. We do not
impose a particular model of price competition, nor symmetry assumptions
and only make assumptions on reduced pro…t functions.
² A.1 ¼I(L) >¼ I(H) and ¼E(H) >¼ E(L)
The …rst part of the assumption reads that the incumbent prefers to
compete against low quality. This means that she enjoys more market power
competing against low quality. The second part reads that the entrant prefers
to be of high quality, a property which is not met by models of pure vertical
product di¤erentiation and price competition. The assumption means that as
a high quality …rm can extend its demand and/or increase price-cost margins.
It is met in many oligopoly models (see Garella and Peitz, 1999).
We further assume that under perfect information a high quality entrant
makes positive pro…ts.
² A.2 ¼E(H) ¡ e ¡ f>0
A.2 implies that under perfect information entry will always occur. Clearly,
under A.1 and A.2 the potential entrant enters and chooses high quality at
4Concerning the possible role of prices or other variables as signals used by the entrant,
they cannot play a role in our simple model. In an extended model one would need to
show that certi…cation is a cheaper way for the entrant to reveal quality than other signals.
8stage 1. At stage 2 the entrant joins the retailer network.5 In subgame per-
fect equilibrium pro…ts are ¼I(H) and ¼E(H) ¡ e ¡ f.T h e i n c u m b e n t h a s
no incentive to exclude the entrant from her retailer network. Thus in this
setup exclusive dealing clauses are not used under perfect information and
therefore arguments in favor or against exclusive dealing which are not due
to asymmetric information have been successfully excluded from our model.
Now we introduce asymmetric information. For the purpose of exposition
we …rst analyze the 5-stage game under the restriction that the incumbent
is forbidden to apply any exclusionary restriction. The entrant of course can
decide whether to join or to sell through a di¤erent retailer network.
The cost of quality can be thought of as …xed or variable, the choice has
no consequence for the analysis as far as it is maintained that manufacturers
are committed to their quality. The cost di¤erence between producing high
and low quality for the entrant d>0 is paid at stage 4.6
In our model the incentives for the manufacturers are straightforward.
A low quality entrant which is believed to be of high quality makes pro…ts
¼E(H)+d ¡ e ¡ f whereas a high quality entrant which is believed to be of
high quality makes pro…ts ¼E(H)¡e¡f. The entrant can thus increase her
pro…ts by d if she can cheat on quality. A high quality entrant wants to be
believed to be of high quality because in this case she gains ¼E(H) ¡ e ¡ f
compared to ¼E(L) ¡ d ¡ e ¡ f.
Moral hazard leads to no entry if ¼E(L)¡e¡f<0; and it leads to entry
with low quality if ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f ¸ 0.
When certi…cation is available, at stage 3 the high quality entrant has
the mean of perfectly revealing her quality, albeit at a cost. Certi…cation
can be interpreted as certi…cation by an outside auditor (Biglaiser, 1993),
warranties, or the entrant’s advertising. The addition of this cost to the
entry cost may make it unpro…table to enter the market.
In case of entry consumers have to form beliefs based on the observation
of the prevailing distributional arrangements and whether or not the entrant
5Under our assumptions the entrant is indi¤erent whether to join the incumbent’s
retailer network. Since there are gains from shared retailing the entrant should always
join the retailer and pay a share of the …xed cost ¸f, ¸ 2 [0;1].
6The cost could also be modeled as a sunk cost which the entrant incurs when it chooses
quality, which implies that manufacturers do not have an incentive to downgrade high
quality after entry because it does not give a cost advantage. This alternative speci…cation,
which we do not adopt however, would need the de…nition of entry costs eH and eL,o n e
for each quality.
9has certi…ed. There are two events concerning certi…cation and two concern-
ing the distribution arrangement. This makes up for four possible observa-
tions: certi…cation and shared retailing denoted by (C;2),n oc e r t i … c a t i o n
and shared retailing (N;2), certi…cation and separate retailing denoted by
(C;1), and no certi…cation and separate retailing (N;1). To keep the analy-
sis simple at this point, consumers either believe the brand is of high quality
with probability 1 or 0. Hence beliefs of consumers are a map from fC;Ng
times f1;2g to fL;Hg and we write e.g. b(C;1) = H for the belief that the
entrant produces high quality if she certi…es and chooses separate retailing.
Since only a high quality …rm possibly certi…es consumers have to believe
that b(C;1) = H and b(C;2) = H. The only degree of freedom on beliefs is
whether a particular retailing arrangement is believed to reveal high quality
in absence of certi…cation.
We analyze markets in which the cost of certi…cation is high, so that entry
with certi…cation is not pro…table:
² A.3 ¼E(H) ¡ e ¡ f ¡ g<0
If certi…cation was cheap enough, then the moral hazard problem could
be directly solved and the only possible role of the retailing arrangement is
to save the certi…cation cost. An entrant would enter with high quality and
sell through the incumbent’s retailer if ¼E(H) ¡ e ¡ f ¡ g ¸ 0.H o w e v e r ,i f
c e r t i … c a t i o ni sc o s t l ys oa st or e s p e c tA . 3a b o v e ,t h e ni ti se a s yt op r o v et h e
following.
Proposition 1 If exclusive dealing clauses are not allowed, the potential
entrant does not enter the market if ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f<0. The potential
entrant enters with low quality if ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f ¸ 0.
In the game where the incumbent cannot use exclusive dealing clauses
only the entrant can provide information to the consumers. The entrant can-
not signal high quality without using certi…cation because there is the …xed
gain from cheating d independent of the retailing arrangement. Proposition
1 characterizes all PBE when exclusive dealing clauses are not available.
2.2 The signaling role of exclusion
The present subsection gives precise content to the idea that exclusivity
clauses help solving the moral hazard problem by signaling through a com-
10petitor.7 First, let us strengthen part of A.1 to
² A.4 ¼I(L) ¡ ¼I(H) >f
This implies that the possible savings from sharing the …xed costs with
the entrant are lower than the gains from unmasking that the latter is of low
quality.8
Although entry with separate dealership is not pro…table we assume that
once the entry costs are sunk it is worthwhile for a high-quality entrant not
to leave the market.
² A.5 ¼E(H) ¡ f ¡ g>0.
Hence, the participation constraint of a high-quality entrant is not binding
in the subgame starting at stage 3 independent of the previous action of the
incumbent.
Then consider the two possible cases: either ¼E(H) ¡ g>¼ E(L) ¡ d or
the opposite inequality. We assume the …rst case,
² A.6 ¼E(H) ¡ ¼E(L) >g¡ d:
Under A.6 the entrant of high quality has an incentive to reveal its quality
in spite of the certi…cation costs. If the inequality in A.6 is reversed, the high
quality …rm prefers to be perceived to be of low quality rather than to certify.
This case is of no interest because quality certi…cation violates the incentive
constraint at stage 3 and thus does not provide a defense for the high-quality
entrant.
We return to consumers’ beliefs. Recall that b(C;¢)=H, i.e. independent
of the retailing structure certi…cation C perfectly reveals high quality. The
beliefs for the observations (N;1) and (N;2), where 1 stands for separate
retailing and 2 for multi-brand retailing can give any probability to H.I n
7Somewhat related literature studies the possibility of brand signaling in the case of a
multi-product …rm (Wernerfelt, 1988; Cabral, 1998; Choi, 1998; Tadelis, 1999) and in the
case of vertically related …rms (Chu and Chu, 1994; Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994). There
are two important di¤erences between that and our work: …rst, in our model there is no
reputational loss for the incumbent whereas reputation losses are important for the cited
works. Second, the incumbent’s action and not his reputation is the key to our results.
8If joint retailing costs were 2f instead of f, namely without scope economies, then
it would be su¢cient to assume that ¼I(L) ¡ ¼I(H) >g . Incumbent and entrant would
bargain over the gain to be split between them.
11this subsection we focus on PBE with beliefs which attach either probability
0 or probability 1 to H. Note that any belief system containing the belief
that separate retailing is associated to a high quality entrant cannot be part
of an equilibrium system of beliefs. Under such a belief system, indeed, the
entrant would choose the low quality at the …rst stage and enjoy the pro…ts of
a high quality without certi…cation. But then the beliefs would be violated.
It follows that all rational 0,1-beliefs necessarily entail
b(N;1) = L:
The complete belief system then is obtained by spelling out that either
b(N;2) = L or b(N;2) = H.
De…nition 1. Beliefs-A: b(N;2) = L.
Then, under beliefs -A and under the assumptions above, a high quality
entrant obtains pro…ts
¼E(L) ¡ d ¡ e ¡ f
if she does not certify, and
¼E(H) ¡ g ¡ e ¡ f
if she certi…es. This is irrespective of the retailing agreement that prevails
after entry. Then, under this belief system, no saving on certi…cation costs
is possible and entry of high quality does not occur. If ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f<0
this belief system sustains an equilibrium path at a PBE along which the
incumbent remains a monopolist.
De…nition 2. Beliefs-B: b(N;2) = H:
Under these beliefs the moral hazard problem can be solved. It is the
incumbent’s threat of exclusion from the distribution channel which convinces
consumers of the high quality of the entrant.
Proposition 2 If exclusivity clauses are legal, there exists a PBE where the
entrant chooses the high quality, enters, shares the retailing structure with
the incumbent. This equilibrium entails the credible threat to keep exclusivity
clauses enforced against a low quality entrant. If exclusivity clauses are illegal
then these equilibria are destroyed.
12Proof. Under beliefs-B the entrant wants to sell through the retailer network
whether her true quality be H or L. However, in case of entry with quality
H, if exclusivity clauses are applied the H entrant certi…es. Recall indeed
that by certifying the entrant obtains ¼E(H) ¡ g instead of ¼(L) ¡ d (see
A.6). Therefore, enforcement of the exclusivity clause only gives ¼I(H) ¡ f
to the incumbent. By contrast, if the incumbent accommodates the entrant
and shares the retailers then he gets ¼I(H) which is obviously a preferable
choice. Then this means that a high quality entrant can count upon being
accommodated in the retailing structure and save the certi…cation costs g.
Also, one can check easily that the incumbent will not accommodate a low
quality entrant, because the payo¤ for the incumbent is ¼I(L)¡f instead of
¼I(H) under common representation—recall that by A.4 ¼I(L)¡f<¼ I(H).
Accordingly, consumers’ beliefs are con…rmed at an equilibrium with beliefs
B. Indeed, out of the equilibrium path if the entrant is L, the incumbent
has an incentive to enforce the exclusivity clauses and to force the entrant
to independent retailing.
The incumbent reacting di¤erently to the high and low quality …rm is
the key to the belief system with b(N;2) = H which allows saving of the
certi…cation costs for the high quality entrant. The above proposition is the
main result of the analysis. It implies that a prohibition of exclusivity clauses
under moral hazard can only prevent the attainment of socially desirable
outcomes.
Our result focuses on entry and the solution to the moral hazard problem.
Denoting by W + social welfare under monopoly and by W(qE) welfare with
entry of quality qE, entry with high quality is unambiguously welfare enhanc-
ing if W(H) >W+ and W(H) >W(L). When considering moral hazard as
a problem from the social point of view these inequalities are satis…ed.
2.3 Equilibrium outcomes, stability and extensions
For a complete characterization of all PBE of the game one needs to introduce
mixed strategies. We concentrate …rst on the more interesting case where
both¼E(L)¡e¡f<0 and ¼E(H)¡e¡f¡g<0, i.e. on the case where neither
a low nor a certifying high quality entrant can make pro…ts when entering the
market (the latter inequality is A.3). Here there are two types of PBE in pure
strategies. The …rst class sustains outcome-a: No entry occurs. The second
class of equilibria sustain outcome-b: entry occurs only with the high quality,
and the incumbent does not enforce the exclusivity clauses against the high
13quality. In addition to the two classes of PBE in pure strategies there may
exist a PBE in mixed strategies in which the entrant enters and chooses L
with a particular positive probability, °, and in which the incumbent lets
the low quality entrant share retailing with positive probability, Á, while it
waves the clause with probability one against an entrant of high quality (see
appendix 1). The set of PBE in mixed strategies in which the entrant enters
with probability 1 is either a singleton or empty. It cannot contain more
than one element because the belief that a …rm is of high quality is uniquely
determined, and so are the mixed strategies of the two …rms. In part 1 of
appendix 1 we characterize the candidate mixed strategy equilibrium in the
case that reduced pro…t functions are linear in expected quality of the entrant.
We give conditions for this candidate to be an equilibrium. If the condition
that expected pro…ts from entry are nonnegative fails then an equilibrium in
mixed strategies does not exist.
An equilibrium which resists the application of the stability criterion by
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) is called KM stable.
Proposition 3 Generically, the set of PBE in pure strategies which supports
the outcome with no entry is not KM stable.
The proof is delegated to part 2 of appendix 1.
This means that, since a stable set always exists, if the pro…tability condi-
tion for the candidate of a mixed strategy equilibrium is violated, the unique
stable set is that of pure strategies equilibria sustaining outcome-b. If the
pro…tability condition is strictly met, then also the mixed strategy equilib-
rium constitutes a stable set. Note that in both cases the exclusive dealing
clauses play a key role in determining the possibility of entry. Both types of
equilibria are destroyed if exclusivity clauses are not allowed.
So far we concentrated on the e¤ect of exclusive dealing clauses in a
market environment in which low quality …rms have no incentive to enter.
If ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f ¸ 0 a low quality entrant has an incentive to enter the
market. Then there exist two classes of equilibria in pure strategies: those
sustaining outcome-b as de…ned above, and those sustaining the outcome,
in which the entrant enters with low quality and the incumbent waves the
exclusive dealing clause because b(N;2) = 0 and since we assumed that there
are economies of scope in retailing. If consumers believe in the signaling role
of shared dealing, namely b(N;2) = 1, the moral hazard problem is solved
(outcome-b).
143 Discussion and examples
The basic principle that an action which apparently hurts a competitor may
not hurt competition is at the root of many defenses of business practices.
The speci…c form that this principle takes in our analysis is that an action
can reveal information about the type of the competitor. In particular, the
application of exclusive dealing in retailing can be done selectively against
rivals of low quality. Therefore, when the action is not taken it reveals
good information about the entrant’s quality. For the signaling mechanism
to work, however, the alternatives to take or not the action must both be
available. Prohibition of the speci…c action considered by law or per se
illegality would eliminate this signaling mechanism and increase entry costs.
² Adverse selection: We obtained our results in an environment of moral
hazard. They similarly hold under adverse selection with exogenously
given qualities of an entrant. If correctly perceived low quality can-
not survive in the market, i.e., ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f<0, there exist three
classes of PBE: no entry, entry of only the high-quality potential en-
trant, and pooling equilibria in which both types enter and share the
retailing network with the incumbent. Depending on the parameters
of the model (and Nature’s probability distribution of types) the set of
pooling equilibria is possibly empty (see appendix 2). If there are no
pooling equilibria we can apply a forward induction argument similar
to the intuitive criterion in order to select the set of PBE in which
only the potential entrant of high quality enters. When on the con-
trary also correctly perceived low quality can survive in the market,
i.e., ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f ¸ 0, entry of low quality always occurs. We obtain
the signaling role of the exclusionary clause when consumers recognize
the informational role of shared retailing so that the incumbent waves
the exclusive dealing clause if Nature has chosen H and enforces it if
Nature has chosen L. In such a market exclusive dealing clauses are
observed and the clause screens between high and low quality entrants.
If exclusive dealing clauses are prohibited, there is no entry, only entry
of low quality, or pooling.
² Boycotts and refusals to deal: Exclusionary practices like boycotts or
refusals to deal would fall much under the same category of action as
exclusive dealing in retailing, provided they are based upon quality
of the target. An illustration may be found in the health insurance
15market in the U.S., where PPO’s can be seen as contractual organi-
zations that select a group of providers of health services among all
those which are potentially available. Excluded providers could appeal
against exclusion by invoking the boycott or refusal to deal. A defense
of PPO’s against such lawsuits is that participation to the group is
granted according to quality standards (Youle and Dow, 1984). Simi-
larly, hospitals have the right to refuse access to providers of services.9
Membership to associations of producers sometimes also performs a
role of quality signaling and refused members can …le against refusal
decisions by the associations. However, the association is not guilty
of hurting competition if it bases refusal on quality standards. To the
contrary, the existence of the association creates an incentive to avoid
the moral hazard trap for producers who want to enter the market.
The reputation of its members is lent to newcomers of the association.
For example, agricultural cooperatives which are engaged in sales and
marketing might need an exclusion mechanism to defend their reputa-
tion. Following our model, they are also interested in sharing expenses
and do not obtain a competitive advantage from exclusion in the case
o fa“ g o o d ”e n t r a n t ,w h e r e a st h e yw o u l dd os oi nt h ec a s eo fal o w -
quality entrant. This seems likely if sales are local so that the e¤ects
of strategic interaction are strong.10
In the case Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. vs. Federal
Trade Commission, 1941 women’s garment manufacturers organized in
the Guild claimed to protect themselves from so-called style pirates by
refusing to sell to retailers who also sold garments from manufacturers
outside the Guild.11 As discussed by Bork (1978, p. 339) “the insis-
tence of the group that copies (i.e. competing products from outside
the Guild; the authors) not be sold by their retailers ... may be nothing
more than an attempt to gain the e¢ciencies of advertising and pro-
9The Federal Trade Commission has recognized that “in some circumstances, contracts
where a hospital grants a single …rm the exclusive right to perform a particular medical
service (e.g. anesthesia) at the hospital can be procompetitive” (Lerner, 1984, p. 213).
10For a historical example of cooperatives in which asymmetric information plays an
important role, see Henriksen (1999).
11The Supreme Court saw the boycott as an attempt to suppress competition and ruled
that it violated the Sherman Act and was an “unfair method of competition” proscribed
by the Federal Trade Commission Act. The worries of the Court may have been that
membership was not open to manufacturers which were not style pirates. However, the
Court rejected to hear evidence from the Guild and did not consider this issue.
16motion that lead to exclusive dealing in many industries”. The boycott
possibly was used as a signaling device which protected the Guild from
sharing their retailers with free-riders. Apart from the signaling inter-
pretation the Guild members also tried to protect their design from
copying. (Professional associations to some extent are also involved in
the same exclusionary practices.)
² Ap l a c et os e l l :The establishment of shopping malls and trade centers
where sellers must apply for the right to install their facilities can also
induce a selection mechanism of a kind similar to those just mentioned.
Again, the idea is that the refusal or acceptance option for a particular
seller in a shopping center can work as a signal. This relies on sellers,
for instance for clothing, to be in direct competition with each other.
Side payments can be implicit in the di¤erent rental agreements with
low rents for well-established, highly reputed brands whose reputation
improves the perception of the shopping mall or trade center in general.
² Comparative advertising: An example of an action which is outside
the …eld of exclusionary practices is represented by comparative ad-
vertising. Whether advertising is or is not comparative is clearly an
observable action which is of the zero-one type. Comparative adver-
tising is then used by the incumbent to unmask a low quality entrant.
To see this we reformulate the …ve stage game analyzed in section 2 so
as to describe an entry game where the incumbent knows the quality
of the entrant better than the consumers. The incumbent can in‡ict
a loss equal to fL (that can eventually be zero) to the low quality en-
trant by running a comparative advertising campaign costing fI.A
high quality entrant can avoid being mistaken as low quality by o¤er-
i n gf u l lw a r r a n t ya tac o s tg. The incumbent will not spend fI against
a high quality entrant if this will not raise its current pro…ts, i.e. unless
this can really induce mistaken consumers’ perceptions of the entrant’s
quality. Again, under assumptions similar to A.1–A.6 about the …rms’
pro…ts, the high quality prefers to defend itself rather than being mis-
taken as low quality. But then the incumbent will not use advertising,
which is costly, against a high quality entrant. This, however, alerts
consumers that the entrant is indeed high quality and the latter can
17avoid the revelation cost g.12
² Price reactions to entry: Another possibility is price signaling by the
incumbent. The incumbent can unmask a low quality competitor by
lowering price, and if this gives him higher pro…ts than in the duopoly
where the entrant is perceived to be of high quality, the threat of a
price war by the incumbent is credible. This can sustain an equilib-
rium where consumers hold beliefs such that the incumbent’s low price
can be a signal of the entrant’s low quality.13 Note that a price reduc-
tion below prices under perfect information in‡icts a direct loss due to
intensi…ed competition and an indirect loss due to the unmasking on a
low quality entrant. Since the price reduction can be varied, the direct
loss is endogenously determined. In our model of retailing, the entrant
does not su¤er a direct loss if the exclusive dealing clause is enforced,
and, in a more general setting, this loss would be exogenous. The en-
dogeneity of the direct loss allows for information transmission even
if the certi…cation cost of the entrant is above the di¤erence between
pro…ts a high quality entrant gets when perceived as such and the ones
when masked as low quality using full information prices. This implies
that a price reduction can signal product quality even if A.6 does not
hold. Also, the endogeneity of the direct loss makes the threat of a
price war potentially a more powerful weapon against low quality so
that low quality is more easily eliminated. The applicability of a price
war as a mean to avoid entry by low quality is however limited: a price
reduction hurts also the incumbent so that a “large” price reduction
will violate his incentive constraint.
² Commitment: Our argument that exclusionary practices and the use of
comparative advertising are procompetitive is based on impossibility to
commit to certain actions before entry has taken place. The actions of
the incumbent have thus to be seen as reactions to entry. If the model
is interpreted as one of comparative advertising this seems to be nat-
ural since comparative advertising only reacts to new entry. Also, we
do not see a meaningful way for the incumbent to credibly commit not
12A related idea of advertising as a signal of product quality is analyzed in Matthews
and Fertig (1990).
13The extensive game would need some modi…cations and the possibility and exact form
of price signaling would depend on the particular underlying oligopoly model.
18to use comparative advertising as a unilateral action by the incumbent.
In the case of exclusionary practices the possibility of renegotiation is
what allows the incumbent to react to entry. The exclusivity clause
assigns a property right on reputation to the incumbent and allows a
contractual arrangements between incumbent and entrant whereby the
latter can pay a side payment to the former in order to use the retailing
network.
It is conceivable, however, that the incumbent can gain commitment to
apply exclusivity restraints irrespective of the entrant’s quality. This
w o u l db ep o s s i b l et h r o u g hi n v e s t m e n t sm a d ea tt h er e t a i l e ri ft h er e -
turns on these investments depend on the distribution arrangement,
namely if they are less under shared retailing. Brand di¤erentiation
investments, like in life-style and luxury goods markets, are possibly
of this kind. If investments can be made such that joint pro…ts under
shared retailing are less than under separate retailing, the possibility
of foreclosure arises.
Apart from investment, commitment might result from procedural rules
of an association concerning access. If such rules delay access they can
e¤ectively eliminate the interest to enter the market thus foreclosing
the market.
4 Conclusions
In a game of entry under asymmetric information, where an incumbent has
the power to adopt exclusionary practices, shared retailing reveals that the
incumbent has not used exclusion. This is valuable information to the con-
sumers. Due to the signaling role of exclusionary practices, competition is
enhanced, i.e. a high quality competitor enters the market. Once entry has
occurred, the incumbent has no interest to enforce exclusion against a high
quality entrant, given that the latter will pay the cost to reveal her quality.
This is an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent.
We do not question that …rms can and do act with the intent of hurting
their rivals—and that this can also apply to the adoption of exclusionary
practices (Krattenmaker and Salop,1986, for instance, de…ne a broad frame-
work of interpretation of practices which hurt rivals). In the model, the threat
to use exclusion against a low quality entrant is credible and such an entrant
would indeed be hurt by the incumbent in this way. Nevertheless, thanks to
19this threat, under moral hazard the entrant chooses high quality and enters
instead of staying out or of entering with low quality. Under adverse selec-
tion, the low quality entrant cannot cheat consumers. She either stays out or,
if she can enter, is obliged to separate retailing, while the high quality shares
the retailer and saves the costs of certifying. Similar arguments apply to the
freedom to engage in comparative advertising, or in price wars against the
entrant. In this context, “hurting rivals may not hurt competition”. Indeed,
the possibility to adopt practices that hurt rivals, can lead incumbents to act
so as to solve a problem of asymmetric information which weighs upon the
entrant.
20Appendices
Appendix 1: PBE in mixed strategies and stability
We consider consumer beliefs with probfHj(N;2)g2(0;1).I f (N;2)
obtains in PBE with positive probability, beliefs have to be con…rmed. Hence,
in any PBE with such beliefs the entrant must be indi¤erent between choosing
H or L. Denote the probability that an entrant under multi-brand retailing
who does not certify is of high quality by b, i.e. b = probfHj(N;2)g.S i n c e
a high quality entrant always certi…es when rejected by the incumbent, the
incumbent always allows for multi-brand retailing when facing H.
In general, the pro…ts of the …rms depend on b in a way which may
not be linear: ¼I will not be a linear combination of ¼I(L) and ¼I(H):
Similarly, ¼E will not be a linear combination of ¼E(L) and ¼E(H).T h i s
said, the calculations for a mixed strategy equilibrium can always be done in
speci…c examples where consumers’ utility functions, the demand functions,
and …rms’ costs are completely speci…ed. In general there is no presumption
that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
Part 1: Characterization of equilibrium in mixed strategies
We shall proceed under the simplifying assumption that expected pro…ts
are linear combination of the full information pro…ts for both …rms. This
case only serves for illustrative purposes. When faced with L the incumbent’s
expected pro…ts as a function of b are
E¼I = Á(b¼I(H)+( 1¡ b)¼I(L)) + (1 ¡ Á)(¼I(L) ¡ f)
where Á is the probability of accepting multi-brand retailing. At stage 2 the
incumbent maximizes expected pro…ts with respect to Á 2 [0;1].F o raP B E
with above beliefs to exist, Á 2 (0;1) because if Á =0 ,t h ee n t r a n td o e s
not have an interest to produce L whereas if Á =1the entrant does not
have an interest in producing H.F o rÁ to be in (0;1), the incumbent must
be indi¤erent between applying the exclusive dealing clause or not to L, i.e.




Note that A.4 implies that b<1. At stage 1 the entrant has to choose
quality. In order to con…rm beliefs, the entrant must be indi¤erent between
21H and L.I fs h ec h o o s e sH her pro…ts are
b¼E(H)+( 1¡ b)¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f ¡ (1 ¡ b)d
because the exclusive dealing clause is not applied by the incumbent and
with probability 1 ¡ b the entrant is wrongly perceived to be of low quality.
Whereas if she chooses L she a¤ords
Á(b¼E(H)+bd +( 1¡ b)¼E(L)) + (1 ¡ Á)¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f
For the entrant to be indi¤erent these two expressions must be equal. This
reduces to




d + ¼E(H) ¡ ¼E(L)
:
Note that when 1 ¡ Á>1 the mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist
because the incumbent applies the clause to a low quality entrant with prob-
ability equal to 1. This happens when b<d = (d + ¼E(H) ¡ ¼E(L)) or, since





d + ¼E(H) ¡ ¼E(L)
A mixed strategy equilibrium exists in the linear speci…cation if the entrant









(¼E(L) ¡ d) ¡ e ¡ f>0:
Clearly, this inequality is violated if f is su¢ciently small relative to ¼I(L)¡
¼I(H). Then no mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
In general, a candidate for a quasi-separating PBE has beliefs b and the
strategy of the potential entrant at stage 1 is to choose L with probability
° =( 1¡ b)=(1 ¡ b + bÁ) and the strategy of the incumbent at stage 2 is to
apply the exclusive dealing clause with probability 1 ¡ Á.
Part 2: Stability – Proof of proposition 3
Let E0 denote the set of all Bayesian equilibria sustaining the outcome
with no entry.
( i )A s s u m e… r s tt h a tno-entry is a strong best reply for the entrant given
the opponent’s strategies and the consumers’ beliefs. Any equilibrium in E0
must be formed by beliefs such that b(N;1) < 1 to guarantee that an entrant
22of low quality gets negative expected pro…ts (indeed we know from A.2 that
¼E(H)¡f ¡e>0, since under perfect information a high quality …rm could
enter, and a low quality entrant would get ¼E(H)¡f ¡e+d>0 if one had
b(N;1) = 1). Let ¼E(b) denote this expected pro…t (if expected pro…ts are
linear combinations then ¼E(b)=b(¼E(H)¡e¡f)+( 1¡b)(¼E(L)¡e¡f)).
S i n c en oe n t r yi sas t r o n gb e s tr e p l yo ft h ee n t r a n tt h e nf o rt h es y s t e mo f
belief under consideration strategy L is not a weak best reply.
A stable set contains all KM stable sets of the game obtained after deletion
of any one strategy which is not weak best reply against the strategy pro…le
adopted by the other players (Proposition 6 in Kohlberg and Mertens 1986).
Then, consider the game G0 which is the original game except for the deletion
of L at the …rst stage. Clearly, the unique equilibrium set of this game is such
that H is chosen at stage 1, the incumbent waves the exclusivity clause, and
the consumers buy according to the belief that both qualities are H.T h e
intersection between the set of equilibria of G0 and E0 is empty and therefore
the set E0 cannot contain the stable sets of G0,s ot h a ti ti sn o tas t a b l es e t
of the original game.
(ii) Assume now that no-entry is not a strong but a weak best reply at the
equilibrium under consideration. Then for L to be a weak best reply one
should have that the entrant be indi¤erent between no-entry and L (and H)
in order for the considered equilibrium to belong to E0. This means that
the incumbent will randomize over the enforcement of the exclusivity clause
against a low quality entrant. Hence we are back to our unique mixed strategy
equilibrium, with the particular parameter constellation which gives zero
expected pro…ts for the entrant. Otherwise the no-entry choice cannot be an
equilibrium strategy. Pro…ts equal to zero in the mixed strategy equilibrium
corresponds to a set of zero measure in the space of admissible parameter
values.
² Remark. When a mixed strategy equilibrium exists and generates pos-
itive pro…ts for the entrant the corresponding equilibrium set and the
equilibrium set sustaining no-entry are disconnected. Only when a
mixed strategy equilibrium exists and generates zero pro…ts for the en-
trant the corresponding equilibrium set and the equilibrium set sustain-
ing no-entry are connected. The equilibrium set sustaining outcome-b
is always disconnected.
² Remark. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) prove the existence of stable
sets. Since the set of equilibria sustaining outcome-a (no-entry) is not
23stable, then the stable set is the one containing all equilibria sustaining
outcome-b if no other set of equilibria exist, namely if there is no mixed
strategy equilibrium. When the mixed strategy equilibrium exists, we
could not …nd any argument to prune it using KM stability.
Appendix 2: pooling equilibrium under adverse selection
Assuming linearity of ¼I and ¼E in expected qualities, in this appendix we
provide the parameter restrictions as to when a pooling equilibrium exists.
Nature chooses H with probability ® at stage 1a. At stage 1b the potential
entrant decides whether to enter. In a pooling equilibrium where both types
of potential entrants enter and share the retailing network with the incum-
bent, posterior beliefs have to satisfy prob(Hj(N;2)) = ®.W ec h e c kt h a tn o
…rm has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
1) Participation constraint of H at stage 1b. This translates into
® ¸
d ¡ (¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f)
¼E(H) ¡ ¼E(L)+d
In the case ¼E(L) ¡ e ¡ f<0 this critical ® is strictly positive. The partic-
ipation constraint of L is then always satis…ed. By A.2 the critical ® is less
than 1.
2) The incentive constraint for H at stage 3 not to certify translates into
® ¸ 1 ¡
g
¼E(H) ¡ ¼E(L)+d
By A.1 and A.6, this critical ® i sb e t w e e n0a n d1 .
3) The incentive constraint for the incumbent to grant a low-quality en-




By A.4 the critical ® is strictly less than 1. Clearly, by combining the restric-
tions on ® there exist parameter constellations such that pooling equilibria
can be ruled out independent of Nature’s probability distribution of types.
This argument in general in the sense that it does not depend on the par-
ticular distribution of retailing costs among …rms. In the alternative model
with bargaining among producers on the distribution of retailing costs 2f




24which is greater or equal to 1 if the competitive e¤ect of higher quality
perception on the incumbent’s pro…ts outweighs the e¤ect on the entrant’s
pro…ts.
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